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Accounting
A. Accounting Methods
1. Wayne Bolt & Nut Co. v. Commissioner, 93 T.C. 500 (10/23/89). Change
from "a seriously flawed and disorganized method of determining inventory"
to a method based on a complete physical inventory constituted a change in
method of accounting. The corrected opening physical inventory was about
ten times the $268,000 book opening inventory under the prior method,
the bulk of the understatements of inventory having occurred in years
barred by the statute of limitations. Section 481 was held to be applicable.
2. Diebold, Inc. v. United States, 90-1 U.S.T.C. para. 50,003 (Fed. Cir.
12/19/89). The change in treatment by an automated teller machine
manufacturer of repairable ATM replacement modules from "inventory" to
"depreciable property" was a change in accounting method that could be
effected only by filing Form 3115, and not by filing amended returns.
3. Rev. Rul. 90-38, 1990-18 I.R.B. 7, revoking Rev. Rul 70-539, 1970-2 C.B.
70, and modifying Rev. Rul. 75-56, 1975-1 C.B. 98. A taxpayer that has'for
two or more years capitalized interest under §266, without making a valid
election to do so, has nonetheless adopted a method of accounting and may
not file amended returns for those prior years. It may only change the
method of accounting with the Commissioner's consent pursuant to Reg.§1.446-1(e) by filing Form 3115.
B. Installment Method
1. Tecumseh Corrugated Box Co. v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. No. 22(3/21/90). The sale of unimproved real property to the Federal
government following a related party installment sale constituted a§453(e)(1) "second disposition" to which neither the §453(e)(6)
involuntary conversion exception nor the §453(e)(7) non-tax
avoidance exception applied.
2. Notice 90-27, 1990-15 I.R.B. 21. Guidance relating to the application of the
(§§384, 382 and new [but not old] 1374) built-in gains rules to installment
sales, which would have the effect of extending these provisions to income
recognized under the installment method during a taxable year following the
expiration of the applicable recognition period.
3. Rev. Rul. 90-46, 1990-22 I.R.B. 10. Three situations dealing with whether
the IRS will grant permission under Temp. Reg. §15A.453-1(d)(3)(ii) to
make a late election out of the installment method. Neither a taxpayer's
change of mind nor a subsequent change in circumstances will suffice, but
permission will be granted where the taxpayer's intention to timely elect out
is thwarted by a mistake which the taxpayer makes a timely effort to
correct.
4. Notice 90-56, 1990-38 I.R.B. 28. The IRS plans to amend Reg. §15A.453-
1(c)(7) to clarify that it may require an alternative method of basis recovery
with respect to installment obligations where basis is inappropriately
deferred, the improper deferral permitting the creation of artificial gain and
a corresponding artificial loss.
C. Year of Receipt or Deduction
1. Proposed regulations (IA-258-84) under §461(h), relating to the economic
performance requirement of the "all events test" for an amount to be
"incurred" by an accrual method taxpayer (F.R. 6/7/90).
2. Proposed regulations (IA-130-86) under §460(b) relating to the "look-back
method" for long-term contract income reported under the percentage of
completion method of accounting (F.R. 6/12/90).
II. Business Income and Deductions
A. Depreciation, Depletion and Credits
1. Browning v. Commissioner, 89-2 U.S.T.C. para. 9666 (9th Cir. 12/5/89).
Depreciation deductions disallowed on three 200-year old violins purchased
before 1982 because taxpayer failed to present any reliable evidence of
claimed 12-year useful life or of salvage value.
2. Clinger v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1990-459 (8/27/90).' Professional
portrait painter was disallowed ACRS deductions for a $9,000 oil painting
hung in her studio because the enactment of ACRS under ERTA did not
eliminate the requirement that taxpayer establish that an asset has a
determinable useful life in order for it to be depreciable. Rev. Rul. 68-
232, 1968-1 C.B. 79, followed ("[a] valuable and treasured art piece does not
have a determinable useful life.")
3. United States v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 89-2 U.S.T.C. para. 9658
(U.S. 12/11/89), reversing Federal Circuit. The §902 indirect credit is
calculated by using U.S. tax concepts of "accumulated profits." The §902
credit with respect to any particular year is calculated by multiplying the
total foreign tax paid by that portion of the foreign subsidiary's after-tax
"accumulated profits" actually paid to the domestic parent in the form of
a taxable dividend (i.e., a fraction, the numerator of which is the taxable
dividend and the denominator of which is "accumulated profits minus
foreign taxes" each with respect to that year). Post-1986 indirect credits are
calculated based upon "post-1986 undistributed earnings" and not on
accumulated profits for a particular year, so the controversy no longer
exists.
4. Wiggins v. Commissioner, 90-2 U.S.T.C. para. 50,362 (5th Cir. 6/26/90).
Retroactive application to 1983 tax year of 1984 Act amendment to §55(f)(2)
alternative minimum tax provision added by 1982 TEFRA, excluding ITC
recapture from the computation of regular tax, was constitutional because
it was a technical correction designed to close an unintended loophole [that
allowed taxpayers to avoid paying ITC recapture in a year they were subject
to the alternative minimum tax].
5. Rev. Rul. 90-62, 1990-31 I.R.B. 4. If gas is sold after it is "removed from
the premises," for a price that is lower than the representative market or
field price (RMFP), gross income from the property for purposes of the
§613A percentage depletion allowance is determined without regard to the
RMFP (which is a ceiling price for this purpose).
6. Rev. Rul. 90-70, 1990-35 I.R.B. 4. If a well is "spudded in" before 1/1/91
and there is continual dwelling until the productive horizon is reached, then
the well is considered to have been "drilled" before 1/1/91 for purpose of
the §29 credit for producing fuel from a nonconventional source.
7. Rev. Rul. 90-65, 1990-33 I.R.B. 5. Economically recoverable precious metals
that are fabricated into, and represent more than half the cost of, an item
used in taxpayer's trade or business are nevertheless not depreciable; the
costs of such metals must be capitalized under §263A and accounted for
separately from the remainder of the costs in order to clearly reflect
income.
8. Oglethorpe Power Corr. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1990-505 (9/24/90).
Electrical generating plant was placed in service not at the time its initial
synchronization tests were conducted in November 1981, but at the time it
was declared available for commercial operation and began producing
income in March 1982; therefore, safe harbor leases executed in April 1982
were valid because the leases were executed within three months of the
plant being placed in service.
9. Colorado National Bankshares, Inc. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1990-
495 (9/17/90). Follows Citizens & Southern Corp. (T.C. 1988) in allowing
accelerated (i.e., present value) depreciation of acquired core deposits using
the net-income stream method.
B. Expenses
1. American Business Service v. Commissioner, 93 T.C. 449 (10/3/89).
Expenses for 49 charter boat cruises which were made available to
taxpayer's approximately 100 permanent employees, but which excluded its
13,000 temporary employees, were not nondeductible under §274(a) because
of the §274(e)(5) exception for recreational activities "primarily for the
benefit of employees [generally]." There was no discrimination in favor of
the "restricted class" of employees and taxpayer was legitimately concerned
about lack of social interaction among its permanent employees.
2. Rev. Rul. 89-120 1989-2 C.B. 66, and Rev. Proc. 89-62, 1989-2 C.B.782.
Automobile standard mileage rate raised from 24 cents per mile in 1988 to
25.5 cents per mile in 1989. See Rev. Proc. 89-66, 89-52 I.R.B. 13 (1990
standard mileage rate is 26 cents per mile).
3. T.D. 8276 and EE-8-89, temporary and final regulations under §§62, 274
and 3121, relating to the reporting of, and withholding on, reimbursements
of employee business expenses (12/7/89). See Rev. Proc. 89-66, 1989-2 C.B.
792, and Rev. Proc. 89-67, 1989-2 C.B. 795 (rules on deemed substantiation
of employee travel reimbursements: The "per diem" rate is either the Federal
rate found in Appendix A of 41 C.F.R., Chapter 301, etc., or $122 for
high-cost localities and $85 for other continental U.S. localities). See also
Notice 90-14, 1990-7 I.R.B. 20 (how an employee may claim an above-
the-line deduction for reimbursed business expenses that were permitted,
but not required, to be reported on Form W-2). See also Rev. Proc. 90-
15, 1990-10 I.R.B. 23, modifying Rev. Proc. 89-67 (optional method for
deducting meals while away from home); Rev. Proc. 90-34, 1990-26 I.R.B.
13 (automobile expense methods).
4. Soliman v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. 20 (1/18/90) (reviewed, 10-6). Self-
employed anesthesiologist entitled to a §280A home office deduction where
he lacked any other office even though his home was not the "focal point"
of his business. Pomarentz v. Commissioner, 88-2 U.S.T.C. para. 9588 (9th
Cir. 1988), distinguished because there the emergency room physician spent
an (allegedly) insubstantial amount of time working in his home office, and
taxpayer here spent over 30%. The Tax Court will no longer follow its
opinion in Drucker v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 605 (1982), reversed, 83-2
U.S.T.C. para. 9550 (2d Cir. 1983). See IR-90-55 (Commissioner will move
for reconsideration in, will appeal from, and will not follow Soliman.)
5. Hamacher v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. No. 21 (3/12/90). The exclusive use
requirement for a §280A(c)(1) home office deduction is not satisfied where
the office is used for both an independent contractor business and an
employee business (where the employee business use was not for the
employers convenience).
6. Rev. Rul. 90-23, 1990-11 I.R.B. 4. For a taxpayer with a regular place of
business, daily transportation expenses between taxpayer's residence and
temporary work locations are § 162(a) deductible business expenses regardless
of the distance involved. Temporary work locations are locations at whichthe taxpayer performs services on an irregular or short-term basis (generally
a matter of days or weeks) and do not include locations at which taxpayer
works on a regular basis.
7. True v. United States, 90-1 U.S.T.C. para. 50,062 (10th Cir. 1/29/90),
reversing District Court. A civil penalty assessed against a pipeline
(Subchapter S) company under §311(b)(3) of the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act for pipeline leakage was nondeductible under §162(f) (and the
applicable example in Reg. §1.162-21(c)(2)) because it was not essentially
compensatory. The penalty was to be imposed in addition to cleanup costs.
8. Rev. Rul. 90-20, 1990-9 I.R.B. 8. Deduction by the carrying party of 100%
of the §617 exploration expenses and §616 development expenditures in
connection with a mineral property carried interest arrangement is permitted
under reasoning similar to that of Rev. Rul. 71-207, 1971-1 C.B. 160, for
oil and gas properties.
9. Danville Plywood Corp. v. United States, 90-1 U.S.T.C. para. 50,161 (Fed.
Cir. 3/21/90). Taxpayer not entitled to deduct a Super Bowl weekend trip
for customers, employees, spouses, friends and children as a sales seminar
business expense because the expenses were not ordinary and necessary
expenses under §162(a).
10. Drake v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1990-176 (4/4/90). Cost of daily
travel to Forty Plus organization was not for the primary purpose of seeking
employment where taxpayer admitted that a substantial amount of the time
he spent there was for purposes other than his own job-seeking endeavors.
C. Losses and At Risk
1. T.D. 8290, and PS-065-89, temporary and proposed regulations under §469
(-2T) permitting §165(c)(3) deductions of nonrecurrent casualty and theft
losses sustained in connection with a passive activity without regard to §469
limitations (2/23/90). See also Notice 90-21, 1990-12 I.R.B. 9 (also explains
how the §280B capitalization requirement applies to demolition of damaged
structures).
2. Rev. Rul. 89-96, 1989-2 C.B. 114. A casualty insurance company that enters
into a retroactive agreement of insurance following a catastrophe may not
include that loss in the §832(b)(5) category of "losses incurred during the
taxable year on insurance contracts" because the requisite element of risk
shifting is not involved; only investment risks were assumed.
3. San Antonio Savings Ass'n v. Commissioner, 89-2 U.S.T.C. para. 9614 (5th
Cir. 11/2/89); Centennial Savings Bank F.S.B. v. United States, id. at para.
9612, cert. granted 10/1/90; First Federal Savings and Loans Ass'n of
Temple v. United States, id. at para. 9613. Regulated S&Ls realized
recognizable losses on their concurrent exchanges of fixed-rate, long-term
residential first-mortgage loans with other S&Ls pursuant to FHLBB
Memorandum R-49.
4. Cottage Savings Ass'n. v. Commissioner, 89-2 U.S.T.C. para. 9662 (6th Cir.
12/4/89), reversing Tax Court, cert. granted 10/1/90. Regulated S&L may
not deduct losses on its exchanges of fixed-rate, long-term residential first-
mortgage loans with other S&Ls pursuant to FHLBB Memorandum R-49
(which held that such losses would not be recognized for financial
accounting purposes) because §165 and Reg. §1.165-1(b) limit deductibility
to losses actually sustained and these transactions did not change taxpayer's
economic position. The Fifth Circuit held to the contrary in San Antonio
Savings Ass'n. (11/2/89) (apparently not available to 6th Circuit at time of
preparation of this opinion).
5. FNMA v. Commissioner, 90-1 U.S.T.C. para. 50,105 (D.C. Cir. 2/20/90).
On FHLBB Memorandum R-49 mortgage exchanges, losses on mortgages
swapped in concurrent mortgage sales program were recognized because the
mortgages were "materially different." Follows Fifth Circuit and disagrees
with Sixth Circuit. However, losses on mortgages replaced under a
Resale/Refinance program were not entitled to be recognized because they
were not the result of genuine exchanges.
6. Halliburton Co. v. Commissioner, 93 T.C. 758 (12/26/89). Loss deductions
(about $8 million) were allowed for 1979 on property (stock and debt of
subsidiary) expropriated by the government of Iran in that year because
taxpayer had no reasonable prospect of recovery as of 12/31/79. The court
so held despite taxpayer's expending time and money through its attorneys
to follow the course of events after 1979 and the settlement of its claim for
about $3 million in 1984.
7. Continental Illinois Corp. v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. No. 12 (2/28/90).
Follows Halliburton Co. v. Commissioner in finding Iranian expropriation
loss deductible in 1979. The result was not affected by taxpayer's holding
of Iranian deposit accounts because taxpayer had no right of setoff and,
therefore, no reasonable prospect of recovery.
8. Exxon Corporation v. United States, 90-1 U.S.T.C. para. 50,132 (CI.Ct.
3/7/90). Allows Cuban expropriation loss to be deducted in 1960.
9. Rod Warren Ink v. Commissioner, 90-2 U.S.T.C. para. 50,465 (9th Cir.
8/20/90), reversing 92 T.C. 995 (1989). For purposes of calculating the
amount of undistributed personal holding company income, embezzlement
losses are deductible in the years in which they occurred because a
departure from the literal meaning of §165(e) (deductibility in the year of
discovery) is necessary in order to avoid an absurd result (arising from
§545(b)(4)'s prevention of loss carrybacks for PHC purposes).
D. Business Income
1. 1989 Act §7611 amended §59(g) to change the calculation of the adjusted
current earnings (ACE) preference for AMT purposes.
2. Proposed regulations (IA-29-89) relating to the corporate alternative
minimum tax adjusted current earnings provisions (F.R. 5/3/90).
3. Commissioner v. Indianapolis Power & Light Co., 90-1 U.S.T.C. para.
50,007 (U.S. 1/9/90) (9-0). The Court rejected the Commissioner's
contention that a deposit which serves to secure the payment of future
income is an advance payment and held that customer deposits did not
constitute taxable income. (The Court noted that an advance payment not
only protects the seller against the risk of inability to collect money owed
it but also protects against the risk that the purchaser will back out of the
deal before the seller performs.) The Court noted the consistency of this
decision with the Tax Court's longstanding treatment of lease deposits, e.g.,
J&E Enterprises, Inc. v. Commissioner, 26 CCH T.C.M. 944 (1967).
III. Capital Gain and Loss
A. Rev. Rul. 90-16, 1990-8 I.R.B. 5. Property transfer to creditor by insolvent
taxpayer in satisfaction of recourse debt (secured by the property) where property
has a fair market value in excess of taxpayer's basis is a sale or disposition
resulting in realization and recognition of gain under §1001 to the extent value
exceeds basis. The excess of the debt over the fair market value is income from the
discharge of indebtedness (subject to the §108 rules). See also GCM 39814
(bifurcated transaction theory).
B. Azar Nut Co. v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. No. 26 (3/20/90). Corporation's $111,000
loss on terminated executive's house purchased for its $285,000 fair market value
pursuant to employment contract and sold at a loss after two years of sales effort
was not deductible as §162(a) compensation but was a §165(f) capital loss under the
Arkansas Best Corp. (88-1 U.S.T.C. para. 9210 (U.S. 1988)), doctrine.
C. ITT Corr. v. United States, 90-1 U.S.T.C. para. 50,214 (S.D.N.Y. 4/6/90). ITT did
not have recognizable loss on the acquisition of its subsidiaries' convertible
debentures upon their conversion into ITT stock of value greater than the
debentures' face value, which debentures were then returned to the subsidiaries for
repayment of the face value.
D. Cook v. United States, 90-1 U.S.T.C. para. 50,288 (1st Cir. 5/22/90). Transfer of
Procter & Gamble stock from husband to wife was made in discharge of a marital
obligation, so wife's basis was the fair market value of the stock at the time of the
transfer -- §1041 not then being applicable. Wife was not considered to be the
owner of property given to her husband by herself and members of her family. A
prior Tax Court holding, affirmed by the Second Circuit, that the transfer was not
a taxable event to the husband, was not binding on wife.
E. Nestle Holdinps. Inc. v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. No. 50 (6/6/90). Redeemable
preferred stock received by accrual method taxpayer on a sale of inventory is§1001(b) "property," not "money received," and, in computing gain or loss on the
sale, is to be included in "amount realized" at fair market value and not at its
redemption price. Taxpayer conceded that a long-term note had to be valued at
face and could not be discounted to its fair market value. (The stock and the note
were sold back to purchaser in the following year for the fair market values
originally reported by taxpayer.)
IV. Corporations
A. Entity and Formation
1. 1989 Act §7203 amended §351 by changing "stock or securities" to "stock";
securities are, therefore, no longer nonrecognition property for §351
purposes. Effective for transfers after 10/2/89.
2. 1989 Act §7208(a) amended §385 to authorize regulations to treat an interest
in a corporation "as in part stock and in part indebtedness."
B. Distributions and Redemptions
1. Caamano v. Commissioner, 89-2 U.S.T.C. para. 9464 (5th Cir. 8/8/89),
affirming Tax Court. In this structural change, making the former parent,
McDermott, Inc. (Delaware), into a subsidiary of its former subsidiary,
McDermott International (Panama), International gave one share of its
common stock plus 35 cents in exchange for each share of Inc Stock.
Taxpayers were former shareholders of Inc. The issue is whether the
International common stock was "property" for purposes of §304(a)(2)(A)
(the parties agreed that the cash was property); if §304 is not applicable to
the exchange, §1001 would be. The court relied on language in §304(b)(3)(B)
in finding that when [International] "distributed its own stock to taxpayers
... the stock [was] not . . . 'property' for the purposes of ... section 304."
The court noted the lack of bail-out of corporate assets.
2. Bhada v. Commissioner, 90-1 U.S.T.C. para. 50,001 (6th Cir. 12/19/89),
affirming Tax Court. Defers to the Tax Court and the Fifth Circuit's
affirmance in Caamano v. Commissioner in this "close" case in which the
interplay of Code sections is "both complex and confusing."
3. Rev. Rul. 90-13, 1990-6 I.R.B. 10. Redeemed shareholders need not
surrender stock in order for a pro-rata distribution in partial liquidation to
qualify as a §302(b)(4) redemption, citing the TEFRA Conference Report(continuing Fowler Hosiery Co. v. Commissioner, 62-1 U.S.T.C. para. 9407(7th Cir. 1962)). The deemed surrender satisfies the §317(b) redemption
requirement.
4. Anchor National Life Insurance Co. v. Commissioner, 93 T.C. 382
(10/28/89). Debt-equity case determined under Ninth Circuit law, with
additional attention paid to the unique financing requirements of insurance
companies. Held to be debt because advances were made for certificates of
contribution issued for emergency financing to meet requirements imposed
by the State of California.
5. Rev. Rul. 90-11, 1990-6 I.R.B. 6. Guidance provided regarding the Federal
income tax consequences, if any, of a corporation's adoption of a "poison
pill" plan. The adoption of the plan is not an income-realization event in
the absence of either a redemption or a post-triggering event transaction.
The rights will be exempted from the §382 option attribution rules so long
as they can be redeemed for a nominal amount without shareholder
approval.
6. Rev. Rul. 90-27, 1990-14 I.R.B. 7. Dutch-auction rate preferred stock is
equity, so dividends received on it qualify for the §243(a) 70% deduction.
There is no arrangement that effectively guarantees that a holder of the
stock can sell its shares.
7. Gunther v. Commissioner, 90-2 U.S.T.C. para. 50,434 (7th Cir. 8/6/90). The
(pre-TEFRA) 1981 transfer of all the stock of one family-owned
corporation in exchange for stock and debentures of the second corporation
fell within the terms of both to a second family-owned corporation §§304
and 351. The Seventh Circuit chose to follow the Tax Court (1964, 1966) -
Sixth Circuit (1968) Haserot-Stickney case in finding §351 to prevail, Judge
Tannenwald's dissent in Haserot II notwithstanding. Section 304 was
amended by TEFRA (1982) to provide that §304 will now govern transfers
which fall under both §§304 and 351.
C. Liquidations
1. Roias v. Commissioner, 90-1 U.S.T.C. para. 50,237 (9th Cir. 4/26/90). The
Bliss Dairy (83-1 U.S.T.C. para. 9229 (U.S. 1983)) tax benefit rule will not
be extended to require a corporation to recognize as income $900,000 of
§162(a) deductions taken for producing unharvested crops that were
eventually distributed to its shareholders during a (pre-1986 Act) corporate
liquidation.
D. S Corporations
1. Gold-N-Travel, Inc. v. Commissioner, 93 T.C. No. 618 (11/21/89). The tax
matters person of an S corporation must be a shareholder (by §6244 analogy
to the tax matters partner); therefore a petition filed by the non-shareholder
S corporation president in response to an FSAA addressed to the corporation
was imperfect. The remedy, however, was not dismissal of the petition; the
court allowed 60 days to cure the defect subject to evidence that the
president was authorized to file the original petition.
2. Radtke v. United States, 90-1 U.S.T.C. para. 50,113 (7th Cir. 2/23/90).
Dividends paid by a Subchapter S legal services corporation to its sole
shareholder-employee constituted wages subject to FICA and FUTA taxes
where the employee's stated annual salary was zero.
3. Ann. 90-44, 1990-13 I.R.B. 25, implementing §6655(g)(4), added by §7209(a)
of the 1989 Act. Estimated tax payments required for corporate level taxes
of S corporations.
4. Dial USA, Inc. v. Commissioner, 95 T.C. No. 1 (7/2/90). The amount of a
shareholder's basis in an S corporation is not a "subchapter S item" that can
be determined under the §§6241 et seq. S corporation audit and litigation
procedures. The court denied sua sgonte the Commissioner's motion for
entry of a decision that included findings regarding the amount of each
individual shareholder's basis in the S corporation.
5. Hang v. Commissioner, 95 T.C. No. 6 (7/18/90). Reallocation of(orthodontic lab) S corporation income from shareholder-children to
orthodontist father, who was not a shareholder of record, was not within the
subchapter S audit and litigation procedures.
E. Affiliated Corporations
1. Long v. Commissioner, 93 T.C. 5 (7/11/89), reconsidered, 93 T.C. 352
(9/13/89). Taxpayer was required to make actual payment -- not merely a
constructive payment -- within 90 days (as specified in the closing
agreement) of an account payable set up pursuant to Rev. Proc. 65-17,
1965-1 C.B. 833 (which account payable was equal to a §482 allocation
made between two corporations entirely owned by taxpayer).
2. Rev. Rul. 89-98, 1989-2 C.B. 219. An excess loss account in a subsidiary's
stock is eliminated following the acquisition of that subsidiary's stock by
a third corporation in a qualified purchase for which a §338(h)(10) election
is made, by reason of the deemed §332 election (and asset sale) resulting
from the election.
3. Notice 89-94, 1989-2 C.B. 416. Guidance for treatment of U.S.-owned
stapled entities under regulations to be promulgated under §269B.
4. T.D. 8294 and CO-78-87, temporary and proposed regulations under
§§337(d) and 1502 to implement General Utilities repeal (3/9/90). This is
done by disallowing all losses on the disposition of stock of a member of
the group filing consolidated returns (the "loss disallowance rule" of -20T)
which would (1) eliminate duplication of loss deductions, (2) prevent "son
of mirrors" transactions as outlined in Notice 87-14, 1987-1 C.B. 445, and
(3) do much more.
5. T.D. 8295 and CO-008-90, temporary, proposed and final regulations on
deferred intercompany transactions and property distributions among
members of an affiliated group (3/9/90). These consolidated returns
regulations (-13T and -14T) set forth rules concerning the creation and
restoration of deferred gain or loss in order to preserve the neutrality
principle underlying the deferral rules.
6. Procacci v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. No. 24 (3/13/90). No §482 allocation
of rent income to taxpayers' partnership from their related corporation for
use of a golf course operated by the corporation at a loss. Factually, the
golf course had been bankrupt and was in poor physical condition, so the
partnership would have been unable to receive any rent for it from an
unrelated party.
7. Procter and Gamble Co. v. Commissioner, 95 T.C. No. 23 (9/18/90). No
§482 adjustments for royalties from P&G's Spanish subsidiary to its Swiss
subsidiary where Spanish law (i.e., Spanish administrative policy) prohibits
the payment of royalties. Commissioner v. First Security Bank of Utah, 405
U.S. 394 (1972), followed. The court rejected Commissioner's argument that
Reg. §1.482-1(d)(6) (taxpayer election to defer income where payment
prevented because of "currency or other restrictions") would be rendered
meaningless by the court's decision.
8. Idaho First National Bank v. Commissioner, 95 T.C. No. 14 (8/23/90).
Losses incurred in disposing of assets (i.e., investment assets, mortgages and
real estate loans) acquired from an insolvent bank which were incurred in
rehabilitating the acquired bank are "rehabilitation losses" which not built-
in deductions under Reg. §1.1502-15(a)(2)(i).
F. Reorganizations and Corporate Divisions
1. Baicker v. Commissioner, 93 T.C. 316 (9/6/89). The transferee corporation
in a divisive D reorganization did not succeed to any investment credit
rights of the transferor corporation with respect to the transferred assets
because (a) section 381 does not apply to a divisive D reorganization and
(b) there is no applicable non-statutory principle requiring a carryover.
G. Personal Service Corporations
1. Sargent v. Commissioner, 93 T.C. 572 (11/13/89) (reviewed, 6 judges
dissenting). Professional hockey players were treated as employees of the
hockey team (partnership) with which each of their own PSCs (of which the
player was sole shareholder, president and sole director) had contracted -
- and not employees of their own PSCs -- because the nature of the team
sport. of hockey involves a high level of control over player activity by
coaches and managers. Income was therefore allocated to players under both
§61 (Lucas v. Earl (U.S. 1930)) and §482. Professional & Executive Leasing,
Inc. (89 T.C. 225 (1988)) followed; Keller (77 T.C. 1014 (1981))
distinguished because there taxpayer was the employee of his PSC.
H. Loss Corporations
1. T.D. 8277, Temporary Reg. §1.382-2T amended with respect to ownership
changes under the option attribution rules (12/23/89).
2. Proposed regulations (CO-77-89) under §269, relating to acquisitions made
to evade or avoid tax in ownership changes resulting from bankruptcy
reorganizations under §382(l)(5) where an active trade or business is not
carried on (F.R. 8/14/90).
3. Proposed regulations (CO-62-87) under §382, providing (prospectively)
option attribution rules that apply in determining whether the §382(l)(5)
stock ownership requirement are satisfied, which options would be deemed
exercised if the exercise would cause pre-change shareholders and qualified
creditors to own less than the requisite amount of stock (F.R. 9/6/90).
V. Employee Compensation and Plans
A. Mirza & Associates, Ltd. v. United States, 89-2 U.S.T.C. para. 9492 (7th Cir.
8/10/89). Actuarial assumption of 5% interest in a defined benefit plan was
unreasonable under §412(c)(3) (for 1980), so the allowable deduction was initially
reduced from $625,000 to $442,000 for that year; the deduction was further
reduced to $115,000 by requiring taxpayer under §404(a)(l)(A)(iii) to amortize
participant's past service over a 10-year period.
B. P.L. 101-140 (11/8/89), repeal of §89 and restoration of health and welfare benefit
plan non-discrimination rules (§ 105(h)) as they existed prior to the Tax Reform Act
of 1986. Taxpayer election to use §89 test for 1989 year.
C. Announcement 90-1, 1990-2 I.R.B. 31. The IRS announced that (pending contrary
action by the Department of Labor) it will not raise "prohibited transaction" issues
with respect to certain incidental services offered by banks to individuals who
maintain IRA or Keogh investments, provided that these investments are treated
in the same manner as other accounts.
D. Rev. Proc. 89-65, 1989-2 C.B. 786, superseding Notice 89-8. The §401(b) remedial
amendment period is extended until the end of the first plan year beginning after
12/31/90, etc.
E. Rev. Proc. 90-20, 1990-15 I.R.B. 23. On or after 4/30/90 certain defined
contribution plans may file for determination letters which include consideration
of the changes made by the Tax Reform Act of 1986 and subsequent legislation.
F. Rev. Rul. 90-24, 1990-11 I.R.B. 6. The transfer of funds from one §403(b)
investment to another §403(b) investment is not a §403(b)(1) distribution provided
that the transferred funds continue to be subject to any distribution restrictions
required for nonelective contributions.
G. Proposed regulations (EE-61-88, EE-22-90, EE-129-86, and EE-44-87) under§401(a)(4), relating to retirement plan nondiscrimination requirements and other
matters including provisions on coverage, §401(a)(26) participation, compensation
ceilings, compensation definition, §401(1) social security integration, cash or
deferred arrangements, and employee and matching contributions (F.R. 5/14/90).
Proposed regulations and amendments of proposed regulations (EE-49-90) relating
to §401(a)(4) nondiscrimination requirements and application of the §410(b) average
benefit percentage test to ESOPs (F.R. 9/14/90).
H. Lima Surgical Associates, Inc. v. United States, 90-1 U.S.T.C. para. 50,329 (Cl. Ct.
6/15/90). Plan and trust set up to pay "severance pay" to employees of a medical
corporation fails to qualify as a §501(c)(9) VEBA because it actually pays non-
qualifying deferred compensation in the form of pension-type benefits on
retirement.
1. Thoburn v. Commissioner, 95 T.C. No. 11 (8/9/90). Participants in a profit-
sharing plan who were disqualified persons nevertheless borrowed money from the
plan, which loans were prohibited transactions under §4975. The IRS is not
precluded from determining §4975 excise tax deficiencies by a settlement agreement
entered into with the DOL with respect to the same violations.
VI. Exemot Organizations and Charitable GivinR
A. Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc. v. Baker, 89-2 U.S.T.C. para. 9576 (2d Cir.
9/6/89) (2-1), reversing District Court. Various "competitive advocate" individuals
and organizations lacked standing to challenge the Roman Catholic Church's tax-
exempt status on the ground that the Church's anti-abortion activities violated the
§501(c)(3) prohibition on lobbying and campaigning.
B. American Medical Ass'n v. United States, 89-2 U.S.T.C. para. 9585 (7th Cir.
10/12/89), reversing District Court. Regulation on the allocation of membership
dues to circulation income found valid even though the final rule differed from
the rule originally proposed because the notice and comment requirements of the
Administrative Procedure Act are satisfied where an agency changes its course[which indicates the agency took the process seriously] so long as the final rule is
generally consistent with the tenor of the original proposal. The crucial issue is
whether parties affected by a final rule were put on notice that "their interests[were] 'at stake"'; interested parties are notified even by a favorable proposal and
can intervene to support it.
C. Phi Delta Theta Fraternity v. Commissioner, 89-2"U.S.T.C. para. 9600 (6th Cir.
10/24/89 (2-1). Income derived from special endowment and used to pay for
publication of fraternity's quarterly periodical is not §512(a)(3)(B) "exempt function
income" but is taxable as UBIT.
D. Manning Ass'n v. Commissioner, 93 T.C. 596 (11/15/89). On declaratory judgment,
held that association formed to preserve the ancient Manning household, etc., did
not qualify for exemption under §501(c)(3) as an educational organization because
its family-focused purposes -- social, recreational and genealogical -- are
substantial nonexempt objectives which "destroy the exemption."
E. American Postal Workers Union, AFL-CIO v. United States, 90-1 U.S.T.C. para.
50,013 (D. D.C. 12/19/89). Union dues and service fees paid by union members to
receive health plan benefits were not unrelated business income because a union-
sponsored health plan is substantially related to the purposes for which tax
exemption is granted to labor organizations.
F. Rev. Proc. 90-12, 1990-8 I.R.B. 20. Guidelines on the deductibility of contributions
to charities that provide token benefits (value of 2% of payment [limited to $50]
or [for $27.76 payment] logo-bearing item costing up to $5.45, plus non-
"commercial quality publications") to contributors.
G. Disabled American Veterans v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. No. 6 (2/26/90) (reviewed,
12-4). Amounts received by §501(c)(4) organization for the (one-time) use of its
donor list were from a business activity unrelated to its exempt purpose but were
excluded from unrelated business taxable income under §512(b)(2) as royalties
because a royalty is a payment for the right to use an intangible asset. Dissent on
the ground that §512(b)(2) encompasses only royalties earned from traditional
sources of passive investment income and what was received here were rents.
H. GCM 39827 (8/20/90). Payments from an insurance company for the use of an
exempt organization's name and logo in return for what are characterized as
"royalty payments" are in reality consideration for the performance of services and
constitute UBTI. Even if the payments are royalties, they are also payments for the
use of the organization's membership list and the entire transaction is "governed by
§513(h)(1)(B)" and the payments constitute UBTI.
L. Calhoun Academy v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. No. 17 (3/1/90). On declaratory
judgment for exemption under §501(c)(3), private school failed to carry its burden
of showing that it operates in accordance with a nondiscriminatory policy towards
black students because it failed to take affirmative steps of some sort in light of
the absence of either a single black student or a plausible explanation of inability
to attract black students.
J. Woodbury v. Commissioner, 90-1 U.S.T.C. para. 50,199 (10th Cir. 4/4/90).
Taxpayers made a valid election under §170(b)(1)(C)(ii) to utilize the 50% method
for deducting their charitable donation of appreciated property when they attached
a supplemental worksheet of calculations to their tax return. They were bound by
that election and could not revoke it in favor of the 30% method when that later
became advantageous.
K. Davis v. United States, 90-1 U.S.T.C. para. 50,270 (U.S. 5/21/90) (9-0). Funds
transferred to taxpayers' Mormon missionary sons were neither contributions "for
the use of" [meaning "in trust for"] the Mormon Church nor were they contributions
"to" [which includes expenses in connection with only taxpayers' own rendition of
services to a qualified organization] the Church, so deductibility under §170 was
denied.
L. Portland Golf Club v. Commissioner, 90-1 U.S.T.C. para. 50,332 (U.S. 6/21/90).
Tax-exempt social club could not use losses from the sale of food and drink to
nonmembers to offset its earnings from investments in determining unrelated
business taxable income where the nonmember sales were not motivated by an
intent to make a profit, for which determination the case was remanded. In making
the "intent" demonstration, taxpayer must employ the same (gross to gross) method
of allocating fixed expenses as it uses in calculating its actual loss.
M. Rev. Procs. 90-30, 31, 32 & 33, 1990-25 I.R.B. 9, 14, 21 & 26. Sample forms and
no-ruling areas for charitable remainder trusts.
N. 885 Investment Company v. Commissioner, 95 T.C. No. 12 (8/16/90). Tax benefit
rule applied to require taxpayer to recognize income in 1983 on its 1983 recovery
of property donated in 1979 even though the 1979 §170 charitable contribution
deduction was erroneous. (The 1979 deduction was not challenged by the
Commissioner.) Unvert v. Commissioner, 81-2 U.S.T.C. para. 9667 (9th Cir. 1981),
followed. The tax benefit concept did not require a complete reversal of the
$115,695 deduction, but the amount of 1983 income was limited to the $21,040 fair
market value of the returned property.
0. T.D. 8308, final regulations relating to lobbying expenditures by certain tax-
exempt public charities and by private foundations. (8/30/90).
VII. Interest
A. T.D. 8281, temporary and proposed regulations relating to the treatment of price
level adjusted mortgages (PLAMs) under the OlD and qualified residence provisions
(1/8/90). A PLAM is a debt instrument with a fixed (3% to 5%) rate of interest
and a principal balance that is adjusted monthly for the percentage change in an
inflation index, designed to be a mortgage with payments constant in purchasing
power instead of dollars.
B. Section 7202 of the 1989 Act amended §163 to provide special rules to limit
corporate deductions (1) of interest on "high yield discount obligations" and (2) of
interest paid to tax-exempt related persons.
C. Williams v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. No. 27 (3/21/90). On the purchase of a
condominium for a $10,000 down payment and a fully recourse, non-interest
bearing note, neither §446(b) nor §461(g) limits the interest deduction of a cash
method taxpayer to the amount of interest that economically accrued rather than
to the amount of interest determined under (pre-1984 Act) §483. The $1,504,000
note required payments of $477,000 in the year of sale and $1,027,000 thirty years
after sale, with the unstated interest being 66% of the total payments.
D. Weis v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. No. 28 (3/21/90). On the purchase of farmland for
payments of $11,500 per year and a $607,000 balloon payment six years later,
accrual basis partnership's annual interest deductions were limited by the amounts
determined under (pre-1984 Act) §483 (about $4,000) and not the ($49,000)
amounts economically accrued under the §461 accrual-of-interest rules.
E. Rev. Rul. 90-40, 1990-18 I.R.B. 5. Interest expense required to be capitalized
under §263A(f) may not be reduced by interest income earned from temporarily
investing unexpended debt proceeds.
F. Huntsman v. Commissioner, 90-2 U.S.T.C. para. 50,340 (8th Cir. 6/14/90),
reversing Tax Court. Points paid on the refinancing of taxpayers' principal
residence were deductible in the year paid under §461(g)(2) because, under the
facts of the case and under the statute's "broad [construction]," the refinancing
merely had to be "in connection with" the purchase or improvement of the
residence.
VIII. Nontaxable Exchanges
A. Rev. Rul. 89-121, 1989-2 C.B. 203. Whether an exchange of assets of one business
(i.e., a television station) for the assets of a similar business qualifies under §1031
requires an analysis of the underlying assets exchanged because the business assets
cannot be treated as a single property. See also Rev. Proc. 89-63, id. at 12 (no
rulings on exchanges of assets of similar businesses (other than real property) until
the IRS resolves this issue). See proposed regulations (IA-12-89) under §1031
relating to exchanges of personal property and multiple properties (F.R. 4/26/90).
B. Section 7601(a) of the 1989 Act amended §1031 to have gain on exchanges between
related persons triggered by the disposition of property received within two years
of the exchange.
C. P.L. 101-194, §502(a) (Ethics Reform Act of 1989), adding new Code §1043.
Elective nonrecognition of gain on the sale of property by a Federal executive
branch officer or employee pursuant to a divestiture reasonably necessary to comply
with Federal conflict-of-interest requirements.
D. Estate of Bowers v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. No. 34 (4/16/90). Descendent's transfer
of an oil and gas lease and his acquisition of a farm did not constitute a §1031
exchange where the farm purchase had been substantially implemented in the
preceding tax year, prior to the attempt to recast the non-interdependent sale and
purchase as an "exchange."
E. Rev. Rul. 90-34, 1990-16 I.R.B. 6. X's transfer of property (Blackacre) to Y, in
exchange for property of a like kind (Whiteacre) purchased from Z by Y and
transferred directly from Z to X, qualified as to X for nonrecognition as a §1031
exchange even though legal title to Whiteacre is never held by Y.
F. Proposed regulations (IA-237-84) under §1031 relating to deferred exchanges (F.R.
5/16/90).
IX. Partnerships
A. T.D. 8274 and PS-19-89, amendments to temporary and proposed regulations
(nonrecourse liabilities) under §§752 and 704 (11/20/89).
B. Saso v. Commissioner, 93 T.C. 730 (12/18/89). Partnership audit procedures with
respect to mining venture. No petition was filed with respect to FPAA. Section
6653(a) and 6661 penalties, as well as §6621(c) additional interest, were determined
with respect to taxpayer-partners in a subsequent notice of deficiency. Held that
these are §6231(a)(5) "affected items" that require partner-level factual
determinations, but the Tax Court lacks jurisdiction over the 1982 partnership
items.
C. Wind Energy Technology Associates III v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. No. 48 (5/30/90).
A notice of final partnership administrative adjustment mailed to the tax matters
partner seven days after the mailing of the commencement notice to the partners
which does not satisfy the §6223(d) requirement that the commencement notice be
mailed at least 120 days before the FPAA is mailed, nevertheless is valid. The
FPAA suspends the running of the statute of limitations for making assessments.
See also Tempest Associates, Ltd. v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. No. 49 (6/4/90)
(mailing of FPAA triggers time limits whether or not a tax matters partner is in
place).
D. Roberts v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. No. 53 (6/11/90). Determination of partner's
amounts at risk under §465 in three partnerships which were based upon alleged
stop-loss agreements with third persons are not partnership items and need not be
resolved in a TEFRA partnership proceeding. A partner-level notice of deficiency
was appropriate.
E. 1983 Western Reserve Oil & Gas Company v. Commissioner, 95 T.C. No. 4
(7/12/90). FPAA notices issued to tax matters partners of bankrupt partnerships
and the resulting Tax Court proceedings do not violate the Bankruptcy Code
§362(a) automatic stay provisions.
F. Woody v. Commissioner, 95 T.C. No. 15 (8/23/90). The Tax Court, in a partner-
level proceeding, did not have jurisdiction to reallocate guaranteed payments, which
are partnership items that were required to be determined in the partnership
administrative proceeding. However, since there was an issue of §6661 additions in
this partner-level proceeding, partner's claimed overpayment attributable to
amounts of guaranteed payments he and others previously reported as income for
the years in issue was within the Tax Court's jurisdiction.
G. Melvin v. Commissioner, 90-1 U.S.T.C. para. 50,052 (9th Cir. 1/23/90). The
California tort law-created right of contribution from other limited partners for
payments beyond taxpayer's pro-rata share of loan was a §465(b)(4) loss-limiting
arrangement for at-risk purposes.
H. Thornock v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. No. 25 (3/19/90). Limited partners were not
at risk under §465(b)(2) and were protected from loss under §465(b)(4) in a
computer leasing partnership whose ultimate unrelated creditor provided funds on
a nonrecourse basis and had no right to require any of the entities related to the
partnership to enforce the limited partners' guarantees.
Rev. Rul. 90-17, 1990-8 I.R.B. 13. In a partnership merger, if the resulting
partnership is a continuation of one of merged partnerships under §708(b)(2)(A),
liquidating distributions by the other merging partnerships of 50% or more of the
capital and profits interest in the resulting partnership do not cause the resulting
partnership to terminate under §708(b)(l)(B).
J. Camobell v. Commissioner, T.C. Mem6. 1990-162 (3/27/90) (Scott, J.). Taxpayer,
an employee of a hotel limited partnership syndicator, was required to include in
income the value of partnership profits interests he received in exchange for his
services because the interests received by taxpayer in exchange for services were
"property" and §721(a) applies only to transferors of property. Reg. §1.721-l(b)(l)
does not, by negative implication, exclude from taxation recipients of partnership
profits interests. Diamond (56 T.C. 530 (1971), aff'd, (7th Cir. 1974)), followed.
Valuation of partnership profits interests based upon present value of projected
tax benefits and cash distributions. Negligence penalties applied with respect to
other issues so question as to whether taxpayer negligent on this issue was not
reached.
K. Hunt v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1990-248 (5/22/90). Limited partnership
formed by three Hunt brothers to hold silver-related assets and obligations, with
Placid Oil Company subsidiary as general partner, was a bona fide partnership valid
for federal income tax purposes, and not merely a financing arrangement for loans
from Placid to the Hunt brothers. Therefore, the dissolution of the partnership and
release of the limited partners from guarantee obligations to Placid did not give rise
to cancellation of indebtedness income.
L. Notice 90-41, 1990-26 I.R.B. 7. Guidance provided regarding the application of the
exemption to the §514 debt-financed property unrelated business income provisions
contained in §514(c)(9)(E) to certain partnerships in which one or more (but not
all) of the partners are §514(c)(9)(C) qualified tax-exempt organizations.
M. Ware v. Commissioner, 90-2 U.S.T.C. para. 50,342 (2d Cir. 6/21/90). Portion of
payments received by attorney upon withdrawing from his law partnership was a§751 unrealized receivable (ordinary income) and not §741 capital gain because the
fee he received directly from a client, not previously includible in partnership
income, was itself an unrealized receivable.
N. Estate of Carberry v. Commissioner, 95 T.C. No. 5 (7/16/90). Special allocation of
partnership 1970 intangible drilling costs did not have "substantial economic effect"
because it did not provide for distribution of partnership assets on liquidation
according to capital accounts adjusted for the special allocation. Additional interest
was imposed under former §6621(c) because the lack of "substantial economic
effect" found is the equivalent of "without economic substance," which constitutes
a "sham" under that provision.
X. Personal and Individual Income and Deductions
A. Miscellaneous Deductions and Credits
1. Hardy v. Commissioner, 93 T.C. 684 (12/13/89) (reviewed). The Tax Court
overruled its opinion in Hootengarner (80 T.C. 538 (1983); aff'd by
unpublished 9th Cir. opinion) and will no longer allow the deduction of
start-up or pre-opening expenses not deductible under §162 under §212(here, loan fees) because: (1) the pre-opening expense doctrine is grounded
on the requirement that expenses and related income be matched in a
particular year and such expenditures must be classified as capital where
appropriate; (2) Congress intended parity in treatment of expenses under
§§162 and 212; and (3) §195 would otherwise be made meaningless.
2. Antonides v. Commissioner, 90-1 U.S.T.C. para. 50,029 (4th Cir. 1/11/90).
Yacht chartering venture was not engaged in for profit (§183) because
taxpayers could not have anticipated making a profit in the foreseeable
future based on taxpayers' cash flow analysis; §6661 penalty imposed.
3. Accardo v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. No. 8 (2/27/90). Taxpayer could not
deduct under §212(2) the legal expenses incurred for his successful defense
of a RICO criminal prosecution because the claim arose in connection with
his alleged racketeering activities and not in connection with his ownership
of income-producing CDs. United States v. Gilmore, 63-1 U.S.T.C. para.
9285 (U.S. 1963), followed. Negligence and substantial understatement
penalties imposed.
4. Polvak v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. No. 20 (3/12/90). Lodging expenses while
in Florida to alleviate chronic ailments, and not to obtain treatment from
a physician in a licensed hospital or equivalent outpatient facility, are not
§213(d)(2) medical expenses.
5. Stephens v. Commissioner, 90-2 U.S.T.C. para. 50,336 (2d Cir. 6/11/90),
reversing Tax Court. Neither the public policy exception to §165 nor the
codification of the public policy exception to the deductibility of §162
expenses bars deduction of $530,000 paid as restitution by taxpayer to the
corporation from which he was convicted of embezzling because the
payment was not made to a government but to a private person.
6. Perry v. Commissioner, 90 TNT 183-13 (5th Cir. 8/15/90) (unpublished),
affirming 92 T.C. 472 (1989). Taxpayer not entitled to §166 bad debt
deduction by reason of her ex-husband's failure to make court ordered child
support and alimony payments because she lacked a basis in the debt.
B. Miscellaneous Income
1. Pistillo v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1989-329 (7/11/89). Settlement
proceeds of age discrimination suit were includable in income in full where
the jury found no willful violation of the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act.
2. Pistillo v. Commissioner, 90-2 U.S.T.C. para. 50,469 (6th Cir. 8/24/90),
reversing Tax Court. Entire settlement award received in an age
discrimination lawsuit is excludable under §104(a)(2) because taxpayer
suffered a dignitary tort and was personally injured.
3. Byrne v. Commissioner, 89-2 U.S.T.C. para. 9500 (3d Cir. 8/22/89),
reversing Tax Court. Entire amount of settlement received on Fair Labor
Standards Act and state wrongful discharge claims was excludable as a
§104(a)(2) personal injury payment.
4. Miller v. Commissioner, 93 T.C. 330 (9/13/89) (reviewed, 2 judges
dissenting). Entire amount received in settlement of defamation action was
excludable from gross income under §104(a)(2). It was immaterial that the
defamation action was for damage to professional reputation (focus on the
nature of the injury and not its consequences) and the settlement included
punitive damages (the statutory language encompasses punitive damages and
Rev. Rul. 84-108, 1984-2 C.B. 32, represents only the Commissioner's
position on a specific factual situation and does not constitute substantive
authority).
5. Rickel v. Commissioner, 90-1 U.S.T.C. para. 50,200 (3d Cir. 4/3/90).
Entire amount received in settlement of Age Discrimination in Employment
Act suit against former employer is excludable from gross income under
§104(a)(2) because the suit was analogous to the assertion of a tort-type
right. But see Burke v. United States, 90-1 U.S.T.C. para. 50,203 (E.D.
Tenn. 3/20/90) (amounts receivable in settlement of sex discrimination suit
were considered back pay and were not excludable from gross income under
§ 1 04(a)(2)).
6. Brooks v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. 189 (2/28/90). Taxpayer recovered
damages which included statutory interest from his attorney for malpractice
on the negligent handling of a personal injury action. The interest portion
of the recovery was not excludable from gross income under §104(a)(2).
7. Section 7641(a) of the 1989 Act amended §104(a)(2) to deny exclusion from
gross income of punitive damages in connection with a case not involving
"physical injury or physical sickness." Applies to awards in, or settlements
of, lawsuits filed after 7/10/89.
8. Adkins v. United States, 89-2 U.S.T.C. para. 9489 (6th Cir. 8/15/89).
Lump-sum payments received in settlement of lawsuit against former
employer for wrongful termination of retiree health benefit program were
not excludable as §106 "contributions" to "accident or health plans."
9. MacNauphton v. United States, 89-2 U.S.T.C. para. 9599 (6th Cir. 10/23/89
(2-1). Upholds jury finding that restricted stock was received in connection
with the performance of services and, therefore, governed by §83 even if
the stock was not received as "compensation." Income was triggered in the
year that the stock was exchanged for (transferable) publicly traded stock
even though the written legend on the stock was removed in an earlier year.
But see Centel Communications Co. v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 612 (3/23/89).
10. Schulman v. Commissioner, 93 T.C. 623 (11/29/89). Taxpayer purchased
for $40 partnership units of his employer on 3/31/79 pursuant to a non-
traded option earlier granted to him; the units were subject to resale
restrictions which were not waived in writing until after 6/8/79 but the
waiver was backdated to 3/31/79 and contained a reference to an event
taxpayer did not learn of until April 1979. Taxpayer valued his units under
§83 in 1979 at about $40 although the other partners sold their units for
$275 in early August 1979 pursuant to a 7/31/79 agreement between all the
partners and the purchaser. Taxpayer sold his units to the purchaser for
$286 on 4/1/80. Held: 1979 compensation of $235 and 1980 short term
capital gain of $11. Negligence penalty imposed.
11. Panel. Inc.. v. Commissioner, 90-2 U.S.T.C. para. 50,347 (8th Cir. 6/15/90).
Section 83 will apply to a restricted nonqualified stock option which was
not publicly traded, received by an underwriter, at the time the option is
exercised or disposed of as provided in Reg. §1.83-7(b)(2) because the
option has no "readily ascertainable fair market value."
12. Maxwell v. Commissioner, 95 T.C. No. 9 (7/31/90). Payment of $122,500
by corporation to principal shareholder under a settlement agreement for
employment-related injuries was excludable from gross income under
§104(a)(2) as personal injury damages (and deductible by the corporation
under §162) because the corporation and shareholders reasonably relied on
their attorneys to conclude that the settlement payment was necessary under
California law -- even though tax considerations also played a part.
13. Notice 90-7, 1990-3 I.R.B. 5. Guidance for the §135 exclusion from gross
income of interest on series EE U.S. savings bonds where the proceeds are
used to pay qualified higher education expenses of the taxpayer or the
taxpayer's spouse or dependent.
14. Rev. Rul. 90-79, 1990-38 I.R.B. 26. An individual U.S. citizen residing
abroad may not offset the gain realized from the sale of a personal
residence with the loss realized on the repayment of the nonfunctional (i.e.,
§988 is inapplicable because the transaction is not business or profit-
seeking related) currency denominated mortgage loan used to finance the
purchase of the residence. Ditto where there is loss on the residence and
gain on the mortgage loan.
XI. Procedure. Penalties and Prosecutions
A. Penalties and Prosecutions
1. Smith v. Commissioner, 93 T.C. 378 (9/28/89). Taxes withheld do not
reduce the amount of underpayment subject to the §6661 penalty, to the
extent the withheld taxes were refunded pursuant to tax returns timely
filed. Woods (91 T.C. 88 (1988)) distinguished.
2. Rowell v. Commissioner, 89-2 U.S.T.C. para. 9519 (8th Cir. 9/5/89).
Attorney tax practitioner's income from tax return preparation reconstructed
by multiplying the average charge for preparing a return by the number of
tax returns bearing his preparer's number, obtained from the IRS service
center. Taxpayer's regular and substantial understatements of income over
several years constituted fraud.
3. Denenburp v. United States, 89-2 U.S.T.C. para. 9606 (S.D. Tex. 10/5/89).
Summary judgment granted to impose late filing penalties despite
accountant's reluctance to file an incorrect return and taxpayer needed
corrected documents to show the true nature of a corporate stock acquisition
from his brothers, which required the cooperation of taxpayer's estranged
brothers.
4. Laurins v. Commissioner, 89-2 U.S.T.C. para. 9636 (9th Cir. 11/17/89).
Fraud penalty upheld for 1973-75 years against an attorney who was a
former IRS employee. The IRS cashing in 1977 of taxpayer's check -- on
the back of which taxpayer wrote that it was in "full accord and satisfaction
of 1977 and all prior years" -- was not an "accord and satisfaction" so the
1973-75 liability was not discharged. The §7122 compromise regulations and
procedures are the exclusive method of settling claims.
5. The Improved Penalty Administration and Compliance Tax Act, 1989 Act
§§7701 et seq., substantially revamped the civil tax penalty provisions of the
Code.
6. Notice 90-20, 1990-10 I.R.B. 17. Guidance on adequate disclosure (of non-
frivolous positions) with respect to the §6662(b)(1)&(2) accuracy-related
penalty imposed on underpayments of tax attributable to negligence (20%
of negligent portion) and substantial understatements of income tax (20%
unless authority or disclosure). Also, substantial authority with respect to
§6662(b)(2) expanded. The Notice also provides guidance on the revised
preparer penalties. See also Rev. Proc. 90-16, 1990-10 I.R.B. 24.
7. Smith v, United States, 90-I U.S.T.C. para. 50,134 (11th Cir. 3/1/90). IRS
entitled to directed verdict on §6672 responsible officer and willfulness
issues despite contentions that (1) officer was advised that any payment to
the IRS would be a Bankruptcy Code voidable transfer and (2) the IRS
approved the employer-corporation's bankruptcy reorganization plan in
which it agreed to collect from the bankruptcy estate an amount which was
less than the total withholding tax owed. See also Hochstein v. United
States, 90-1 U.S.T.C. para. 50,205 (2d Cir. 4/3/90)(2-l)(controller liable
even though financing firm furnished only net payroll).
8. Estate of Wilbanks v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. No. 18 (3/6/90). Partial
summary judgment granted to the effect that Commissioner did not abuse
his discretion by refusing to grant an extension of time to file an estate tax
return which was requested three months after the due date of the return.
9. United States v. Energy Resources Co., 90-1 U.S.T.C. para. 50,281 (U.S.
5/29/90) (8-1). A bankruptcy court has the authority to order the IRS to
treat payments made by Chapter 11 bankruptcy debtors as trust fund
payments, where the bankruptcy court determines this is necessary for the
success of a reorganization plan.
10. Begier v. IRS, 90-1 U.S.T.C. para. 50,294 (U.S. 6/4/90)(9-0). Payments of
§7501 trust fund taxes from a bankrupt's general accounts cannot be avoided
by the trustee as preferences because they were not transfers of "property
of the debtor" but were transfers of property held in trust.
11. Notice 90-45, 1990-28 I.R.B. 11. Information return penalties under §§6721-
6724, revised in the 1989 Act, which increase after 30 days and after
August 1, will be applied in 1990 subject to a prior administrative policy
providing for waiver where the filer furnishes corrected information by
October 1, except that under the prior administrative policy the waiver for
failure to file was based on a showing of reasonable cause.
12. Estate of McClanahan v. Commissioner, 95 T.C. No. 8 (7/24/90). Declining
health of CPA does not excuse imposition of negligence penalties for failure
to file his own tax returns on a timely basis for seven consecutive years.
Substantial understatement penalties under §6661 at the 25% rate were
properly imposed in addition to the negligence penalties.
13. Sage v. United States, 90-2 U.S.T.C. para. 50,453 (5th Cir. 8/13/90). The
§6501(a) three-year statute of limitations does not bar the assessment of
§6700 penalties for abusive tax shelter promotion; "laches alone provides
preclusive effect on the IRS's penalty power." Planned Investments. Inc. v.
United States, 89-2 U.S.T.C. para. 9470 (6th Cir. 1989), followed.
14. Cannata v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1990-502 (9/24/90). Extensions of
time to file, reporting zero estimated tax liability, were valid because
taxpayers did not fail to "properly estimate" their tax liability even though
their accountant overlooked a Form 1099-MISC reflecting a $195,825.90
income item when he calculated taxpayers' estimated tax liability, so
taxpayers were not liable for the §6651(a)(1) failure to file penalty. Crocker
v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 899 (1989), distinguished.
B. Litigation Costs
1. Cassuto v. Commissioner, 93 T.C. 256 (8/28/89). Attorney's fees under
§7430 (effective 1986-88) awarded where Commissioner's position for two
out of three years was not substantially justified. Fees were limited to $75
per hour, adjusted for inflation, despite far higher prevailing market rates.
2. Powell v. Commissioner, 90-1 U.S.T.C. para. 50,036 (5th Cir. 1/16/90),
reversing Tax Court. In this §7430 (effective 1983-85) case, the Tax Court
erred in denying the requested $200 hourly rate by limiting fees to a $75
hourly rate.
3. Buchanan v. United States, No. 89-35704, 90 TNT 146-22 (9th Cir.
6/27/90) (unpublished). The district court did not abuse its discretion in
awarding attorney's fees under §7430 by reason of the Service's attempt to
enforce a levy on homeowner's house which IRS thought belonged to a
church owing more than $300,000 in delinquent taxes. The court felt the
IRS had "jumped to a conclusion" and should have investigated further as
to ownership where its only evidence of ownership by the church was
homeowner's testimony under oath and the house deed to the church given
by the homeowner.
C. Statutory Notice
1. McKay v. Commissioner, 89-2 U.S.T.C. para. 9574 (9th Cir. 10/6/89) (2-
1). Statutory notice was valid where taxpayer timely received it, even
though it was not sent to his "last known address." (Taxpayer timely
received the copy of the notice of deficiency sent to his attorney.)
2. Borgman v. Commissioner, 89-2 U.S.T.C. para. 9635 (1st Cir. 11/17/89). A
notice of deficiency mailed to taxpayer at two of his former Illinois
addresses, despite his having informed the revenue agent auditing his return
of a new Massachusetts address four months earlier, sufficed to toll the
statute of limitations as of the day of mailing when the postal service
forwarded one of the notices to the new address and taxpayer received it
five days after it was mailed -- two days after the statute of limitations
would have run out. Neither §6212(a) or §6212(b)(1) prescribes the address
to which the notice must be mailed, but the latter subsection sets up a "safe
harbor" for Commissioner [mailing to last known address] where taxpayer
does not actually receive the notice.
3. Coleman v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. 82 (2/26/90). Taxpayer unsuccessfully
asserted a statute of limitations defense; IRS "habit evidence" plus an
incomplete Postal Service Form 3877 sufficed for the IRS to prove timely
mailing of the notice of deficiency.
4. Miller v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. No. 19 (3/8/90). Joint notice of deficiency
was valid as to divorced wife where it was timely sent to husband's address
and husband forwarded a copy of it to wife who filed a. timely Tax Court
petition even though she did not actually receive her copy until more than
3 years after two of the tax returns were filed because it was the mailing
that tolled the period of limitations.
5. Rev. Proc. 90-18, 1990-13 I.R.B. 19. Methods of informing the IRS of a
change in taxpayer's address. See also IR-90-44 (Form 8822 -- change of
address).
6. Ward v. Commissioner, 90-2 U.S.T.C. para. 50,430 (5th Cir. 8/1/90),
reversing Tax Court. Deficiency notice mailed to prior address while IRS
was still processing taxpayer's change of address notification was not valid
because IRS did not use reasonable diligence where the IRS agent was
ignorant of the meaning of the computer code indicating that a change of
address was pending. The IRS was deemed to have notice of the address
change at the time the computer code was posted and could have delayed
sending the deficiency notice until the new address was entered into the
computer. A different result might apply if taxpayer sent a change of
address notification at a time when the limitations period had nearly run.
7. Pearce v. Commissioner, 95 T.C. No. 20 (9/12/90). Notice of deficiency (or
transferee liability) was held valid where it was based, in part, on a
"determination" that taxpayer had not filed a tax return -- even though this
determination was wrong -- because the notice on its face did not reveal
that the Commissioner failed to make a determination. Scar v.
Commissioner, (9th Cir. 1987), distinguished. But see Kong v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1990-480 (9/6/90) (notice of deficiency assessing
tax at 70% rate because of the unavailability of taxpayer's return held
invalid, following Scar; the fact that the amount disallowed was the same
as the amount disallowed on the return for the correct partnership was not
relevant).
D. Statute of Limitations
1. Estate of Taft v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1989-427 (8/15/89). A tax
attorney was not estopped from raising the statute of limitations when he
inserted a specific 7-1/2 month time limit, readily visible, on each of the
Form 872-A consents he signed, which the IRS review staff employee did
not notice. There was lack of equitable estoppel because taxpayer did not
make a false representation or a wrongful misleading silence.
2. Huene v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1989-570 (10/24/89). A restricted
"Form 872M" created by a taxpayer with the intent to mislead IRS
employees that the form was a Form 872A was not valid to extend the
statute of limitations and to limit taxpayers' liability on a deficiency to $50.
Taxpayers were estopped from asserting the statute of limitations.
3. Masraff v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1989-638 (11/30/89). A Form 872-
A (revised 9/80) consent to extend the 1980 statute of limitations is not
terminated by an overassessment on Form 870 for that year. The court held
that I.R.M. §4541.81(5) (6/12/84) to the contrary did not change the plain
meaning of the words on the Form 872-A.
4. Kelley v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1990-158 (3/26/90). Follows Woods
(92 T.C. 776 (1989)) in permitting equitable reformation for mutual mistake
and finding Form 872-A to be valid for 1978 year as the parties intended
and not for the 1979 taxable year as stated in its text.
5. Kernan v. Commissioner, 90-1 U.S.T.C. para. 50,252 (9th Cir. 5/3/90).
Execution of a Form 872 for a particular tax year does not terminate a
prior Form 872-A indefinite extension of the statute of limitations.
6. Stenclik v. Commissioner, 90-2 U.S.T.C. para. 50,374 (2d Cir. 6/26/90).
Form 872-A agreement to extend the statute of limitations is indefinite and
is not terminated after the passage of a "reasonable time" nor does laches
apply; notice of deficiency issued more than three years later was timely.
7. Illinois Masonic Home v. Commissioner, 93 T.C. 145 (8/2/89). The
expiration of the period of limitations on assessment of additional estate tax
before the distribution of estate assets to petitioners not only bars the
remedy of collecting additional estate tax from the petitioners as transferees,
but also extinguishes the estate's liability as well. Diamond Gardner
Corporation, 38 T.C. 875 (1962), followed. A transferee cannot be held
liable for the transferor's tax if the expiration of the period of limitations
has extinguished the transferor's liability before the assets were transferred
because §6901 merely provides for a secondary method of enforcing the
liability of the transferor.
8. Fehlhaber v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. No. 54 (6/13/90) (reviewed,
unanimous). A notice of deficiency sent after the expiration of the
limitations period for an S corporation, but prior to limitations expiration
for its sole shareholder, was timely for an assessment to be made against the
shareholder. The court refused to follow Kelley v. Commissioner, 89-I
U.S.T.C. para. 9360 (9th Cir. 1989), because the appeal lies to another
circuit.
9. Fendell v. Commissioner, 90-2 U.S.T.C. para. 50,345 (8th Cir. 6/22/90).
Expiration of the three-year limitation period for the trust at the time
deficiency notices were issued against the trust beneficiaries bars
deficiencies against the beneficiaries resulting from the disallowance of
losses claimed by the trust.
10. Calumet Industries, Inc. v. Commissioner, 95 T.C. No. 21 (9/13/90).
Commissioner is not barred from assessing a deficiency for an open year
(1979) attributable to an NOL carryback adjustment from an otherwise
closed year (1981) because §6501(h) (permitting a deficiency to be assessed
in an otherwise closed year based upon the adjustment of an NOL
carryback from an open year) is inapplicable and does not nullify the
agreed-upon §6501(c)(4) extension for 1979.
E. Miscellaneous
1. Belk v. Commissioner, 93 T.C. 434 (10/2/89). Taxpayer-wife was allowed
"innocent spouse" relief under §6013(e) with respect to "grossly erroneous
items" for which there was "no basis in fact or law" (i.e., capital loss
carryovers, clerical mistakes, but not losses sustained in a year and claimed
in that year as a protective measure). Late filing penalty imposed on wife
even though husband assumed the duty to file and failed to do so.
2. Bokum v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. 126 (2/28/90) (reviewed, 5 judges
dissenting). Wife not entitled to innocent spouse status under §6013(e)
because she had knowledge of the transaction which gave rise to the error
on the tax return. Majority declines to follow Price v. Commissioner, 89-
2 U.S.T.C. para. 9598 (9th Cir. 10/18/89), reversing Tax Court. Dissent on
the ground that knowledge means she "had reason to know that the
deductions were phony."
3. Ness v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. No. 47 (5/29/90). The fact that a portion of
a claimed deduction had been disallowed did not thereby make it a "grossly
erroneous item" for purposes of the §6013(e) innocent spouse provisions; the
deduction did have "a basis in law."
4. Zackim v. Commissioner, 89-2 U.S.T.C. para. 9582 (3d Cir. 10/13/89),
reversing Tax Court. Res judicata based upon a Tax Court decision (entered
pursuant to a stipulation of settlement) does not apply to tax fraud in the
same year, whether the fraud was discovered before or after the Tax Court
decision, because §6212(c) excludes claims for tax fraud from claim
preclusion.
5. Koranga v. Commissioner, 90-1 U.S.T.C. para. 50,030 (4th Cir. 1/2/90). The
Tax Court properly denied taxpayers' motion to modify a settlement
stipulation on the ground of unilateral mistake because there was no
evidentiary record to support their claim of mistake. The $270,000
settlement of a claim based on $638,000 of unexplained deposits allegedly
included the double-counting of a $228,000 item.
6. Conklin v. Commissioner, 90-1 U.S.T.C. para. 50,131 (10th Cir. 3/1/90),
reversing Tax Court. Tavery v. Commissioner, 90-I U.S.T.C. para. 50,121
(10th Cir. 3/1/90), reversing District Court. On separate deficiency notices
issued against husband and wife, Tax Court lacked jurisdiction where wife
paid the four asserted contested deficiencies before the IRS issued husband's
notice of deficiency. (Commissioner also asserted four additional items
against husband which Commissioner conceded before trial, but once the
concession was accepted by the Tax Court the case became nonjusticiable.)
Wife was not precluded by the doctrine of collateral estoppel.
7. Onan Corporation v. United States, 90-1 U.S.T.C. para. 50,136 (Cl. Ct.
3/8/90). Corporation not entitled to 14 days' additional interest where IRS
sent a refund check instead of making the requested (electronic) wire
transfer.
8. Doolin v. Uriited States, 90-1 U.S.T.C. para. 60,022 (N.D.N.Y. 4/20/90).
Estate not entitled to recover interest on estate tax overpayment accruing
after the March 1986 date the IRS sent by ordinary mail a refund check -
- even though the check was not received and was not replaced until March
1990, because U.S. district courts lack authority beyond §661 l(b)(2) to
award interest (which can be awarded only until tender of the refund
check).
9. United States v. Dalm, 90-1 U.S.T.C. para. 50,154 (3/20/90) (6-3), reversing
Sixth Circuit. The doctrine of equitable recoupment may not be used as the
sale basis for jurisdiction in an otherwise time-barred refund suit
(Kennedy). Taxpayer's litigation of her income tax liability in the Tax Court
(without raising an equitable recoupment claim based on gift tax paid)
forecloses her from litigating that claim now in a separate action for refund
of gift tax. Bull v. United States, 295 U.S. 247 (U.S. 1935), distinguished.
Dissent (Stevens) on the ground that the Tax Court lacked jurisdiction to
consider a plea of equitable recoupment, so Bull should apply. See also
Fairlev v. United States, 90-1 U.S.T.C. para. 60,018 (8th Cir. 4/26/90).
10. First Western Government Securities, Inc. v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. No. 32
(4/9/90)(Nims, J.) (reviewed, unanimous). Assignment of 12 test cases
involving forward contracts for Government mortgage-backed securities to
a special trial judge under §7443A was proper under the U.S. Constitution.
Interlocutory appeal on this issue certified.
11. Emmons v. Commissioner, 90-1 U.S.T.C. para. 50,217 (5th Cir. 4/11/90).
Late returns are considered filed as of the date of delivery, and not as of
the postmark date (§7502(a)(2)).
12. Rev. Proc. 90-17, 1990-12 I.R.B. 13. New (increased) user fees for requests
for private letter rulings (generally, $2,500) and determination letters
(generally, $1,250).
13. Rev. Proc. 90-42, 1990-31 I.R.B. 59 and Announcement 90-65, 1990-20
I.R.B. 23, revoking Rev. Proc. 90-13, 1990-9 I.R.B. 23. The "comfort
rulings" policy will not go into effect, but will be replaced with other
measures.
14. T.D. 8297, temporary regulations under §7605, relating to the time and place
for conducting tax examinations (4/2/90). The regulations provide that
Service generally will not adjust the place of examination based on the
location of the office of taxpayer's representative; if less than 13 months
remains on the statute of limitations, an extension will be required to
accommodate a taxpayer's request for transfer.
15. Proposed regulations (IA-130-87) under §6045(e), to expand the information
reporting requirements for real estate transactions occurring on and after
1/1/91 (F.R. 4/18/90).
16. Sergv v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1990-442 (8/15/90). Taxpayers could
not hold IRS to the terms of a settlement agreement they had signed
because it was clear at the time of signing that the agreement might be
altered at a later date, so there was no meeting of the minds.
17. T.D. 8312, final regulations relating to §6081(a) extension of time to file
federal income tax returns and to pay any taxes owing by citizens and U.S.
residents whose tax homes, in a real and substantial sense, are outside of the
United States and Puerto Rico and who are not merely travelling abroad on
the due date of the return (9/7/90).
XII. Tax Shelters
A. Hayden v. Commissioner, 89-2 U.S.T.C. para. 9642 (6th Cir. 11/22/89) (2-1),
affirming Tax Court. The disallowance of amortization deductions for a 7-year
partnership licensing agreement was affirmed on the ground that the transactions
were not entered into with a bona fide profit objective. Dissent on the ground that
the transaction had economic substance if analyzed over the 17-year life of the
patent, as opposed to the 7-year term of the partnership's license.
B. Autrey v. United States, 89-2 U.S.T.C. para. 9659 (11th Cir. 12/6/89)(2-1). Jury
verdict in favor of cattle breeding tax shelter promoters on assessments under
§§6700, 6701 and 6694 was vacated and the case remanded for retrial because it
was improper for the jury, in determining whether the tax shelters lacked economic
substance, to have considered the values for the bull semen, the warranty of
fertility and the management services provided to investors by cattle breedings
enterprises because these items had no value as a matter of law.
C. Burrill v. Commissioner, 93 T.C. 643 (12/11/89). Loss and interest deductions
claimed on metals futures transactions were disallowed because the transactions did
not occur. Negligence penalty applied.
D. A. Ross Winans Grantor Trust v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 1989-653 (12/12/89).
In these test cases for thoroughbred breeding programs, the court found the
transactions were motivated by business purpose and had economic substance, but
prices paid for horses and breeding rights far exceeded their fair market values (to
which depreciation deductions were limited). Overvaluation (§6659) and substantial
understatement (§6661) penalties, as well as the interest penalty (§66621(c)), were
imposed -- but not the negligence penalty (§6653(a)).
E. Shuman v. United States, 90-1 U.S.T.C. para. 50,045 (5th Cir. 1/5/90), reversing
District Court. Reverses summary judgment for "art masters" promoters in §6700
penalty case because government expert's opinion that "master plates" lacked value
was sufficient to raise factual issues.
F. Lockwood v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. 252 (2/28/90). Master recordings were retired
by "actual physical abandonment" (under Reg. §1.167(a)-8(a)(4)) when taxpayer
stored them in a non-temperature controlled closet in his home and the
abandonment was an exchange, permitting the deduction of a loss equal to his
adjusted basis, but also requiring his benefit on the extinguishing of the
nonrecourse debt on abandonment to offset his loss. The recordings were not
"permanently retired... but not disposed of... or physically abandoned" (under
Reg. §1.167(a)-8(a)(3)) which would have permitted recognition of loss measured
by the excess of adjusted basis over estimated salvage or fair market value. The
court noted that exchange treatment would not necessarily arise had the debt been
recourse.
G. James v. Commissioner, 90-1 U.S.T.C. para. 50,185 (10th Cir. 3/26/90), and Shriver
v. Commissioner, 90-1 U.S.T.C. para. 50,190 (8th Cir. 3/28/90), Computer sale-
leaseback tax shelters were shams lacking economic substance.
H. Sheldon v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. No. 46 (5/29/90) (reviewed, 9-7). Treasury bill
straddle transactions (involving purchases and repos) were "real" but "lacked tax-
independent" purpose (or, "economic substance") so taxpayer's large interest
deduction in the current year (with corresponding interest income deferred to a
later year) was denied, following Goldstein v. Commissioner, 66-2 U.S.T.C. para.
9561 (2d Cir. 1966). Dissent on the ground that some of the transactions involved
"purposive" borrowings because they initially had profit potential.
1. Heasley v. Commissioner, 90-1 U.S.T.C. para. 50,314 (5th Cir. 6/5/90). Penalties
against blue-collar taxpayers based on O.E.C. Leasing Corporation tax shelter were
disallowed. Valuation penalty (§6659) improper where the IRS completely
disallowed the deductions and credits containing the valuation overstatement,
following Todd (89-1 U.S.T.C. para. 9116 (5th Cir. 1988)). Negligence penalty
(§6653(a)) improper because too stringently applied; moderate-income investors
need not independently investigate their investments but may rely on their financial
advisors and accountants. Substantial understatement penalty (§6661) should have
been waived because of the same reliance. Additional interest penalty (§6621(c))
should also have been waived.
J. Frevtag v. Commissioner, 90-2 U.S.T.C. para. 50,381 (5th Cir. 7/6/90). Loss
deductions for First Western Government Securities commodities straddle program
investments were disallowed because they were sham transactions or (alternatively)
were not entered into primarily for economic profit. Special trial judge's report was
properly issued by the Tax Court in the name of the chief judge (Sterrett) even
though the chief judge's adoption was done on the same day as the special trial
judge's report.
K. Evans v. Commissioner, 90-2 U.S.T.C. para. 50,387 (8th Cir. 7/13/90), reversing
Tax Court. Motion picture limited partnership had the requisite "§183" profit
objective when it purchased a major Hollywood firm ["Heartbeat"] and executed
an exclusive distribution agreement with the movie's seller. The court reviewed the
evidence was "left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
made by the tax court" because the partnership operated in a business-like manner,
the purchase price did not exceed the cost of production and the lack of hobby
aspects. While a $28.5 million gross was necessary for a profit, a 60% bracket
limited partner could recoup his cash investment at an $8 million gross.
L. Casebeer v. Commissioner, 90-2 U.S.T.C. para. 50,435 (9th Cir. 8/6/90). Affirms
Tax Court decision holding Finalco computer leasing shelters to be shams, lacking
business purpose and economic substance.
M. Datamatic Services. Inc. v. United States, 90-2 U.S.T.C. para. 50,437 (7th 8/9/90).
Affirms abusive tax shelter penalty on a company that sold medical equipment to
investors for leasing to physicians.
N. Bailey v. Commissioner, 90-2 U.S.T.C. para. 50,474 (2d Cir. 8/21/90) (2-1),
affirming, vacating and remanding 90 T.C. 558 (1988). In movie tax shelter, the
findings of the Tax Court (1) that notes were not bona fide debt representing a
depreciable investment in the stream of payments generated by the movies and (2)
the interest payments on the notes were not deductible were vacated to see whether
the amount of the notes was closely related to the value of the assets purchased.
0. Hines v. United States, 90-2 U.S.T.C. para. 50,477 (4th Cir. 9/4/90), reversing 89-
2 U.S.T.C. para. 9523 (E.D.N.C. 1989). Systems Leasing computer tax shelter was
a sham, lacking economic substance aside from the tax consequences.
XIII. Trusts, Estates & Gifts
A. Gross Estate
1. Smoot v. United States, 90-1 U.S.T.C. para. 60,002 (7th Cir. 12/27/89).
Reg. §20.2032A-8(a)(2), which provides that remainder interests of qualified
heirs which are subject to divestment in favor of non-qualified heirs
disqualify the property for special use valuation, could not be relied upon
by the IRS where there was a possibility that a testamentary power of
appointment could be exercised in favor of nonqualified heirs. Instead, the
"wait and see" approach adopted by Congress elsewhere in §2032A applied
here (to §2032A(c)(1)).
2. Estate of Fletcher v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. No. 5 (1/31/90). Certificate
of deposit (payable on death) and Series E bonds (husband "or" decedent)
includable in decedent's estate because she died three hours after her
husband in an automobile accident by reason (respectively) of Oklahoma law
and Federal law.
3. Prussner v. United States, 90-1 U.S.T.C. para. 60,007 (7th Cir. 2/15/90).
Section 2032A special use valuation election held valid despite executor's
failure to attach a recapture agreement as required by the regulations.
4. Estate of Newhouse v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. No. 14 (2/28/90). Value of
closely held stock with different stock classes having confused rights is
subject to discounts for the possibility of litigation costs and also (35%) for
lack of control and lack of marketability.
5. Gradow v. United States, 90-1 U.S.T.C. para. 60,010 (Fed Cir. 3/1/90).
Full value of community property transferred by decedent to a trust in
exchange for a life estate was includable under §2036 because the transfer
was not for full and adequate consideration. The transferred property was
considered to be one-half of the fee, and not the value of decedent's
remainder interest in half of the community property. A consideration
credit under §2043 was allowed.
6. Rev. Rul. 90-21, 1990-9 I.R.B. 13. Life insurance proceeds (payable to a
third party for a non-business purpose) are includible in a decreased
stockholder's gross estate under §2035 where the stockholder disposed of
control of the corporation owning the policy for less than adequate
consideration within 3 years of death.
7. Estate of Wood v. Commissioner, 90-2 U.S.T.C. para. 60,031 (8th Cir.
7/26/90)(2-1). Section 2032A special use valuation election on a never-
received estate tax return was made timely (because of the common law
doctrine that mailing created a presumption of delivery) based upon the
testimony of the estate's attorney and the Easton, MN postmistress, who
remembered the timely mailing and post-marking of the estate tax return,
which testimony was credited by the Tax Court. The Commissioner argued
that the §7502 scheme envisions that only mailing by registered or certified
mail creates a presumption of delivery.
8. Estate of Pattison v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1990-428 (8/8/90). Court
agrees with government expert's valuation of Waller County property based
upon its highest and best use as rural residential property, and not with
taxpayer's expert who valued the property as agricultural property.
9. Estate of Murohy v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1990-472 (8/30/90).
Minority discounts not allowed for estate tax purposes on the testamentary
exercise of a power of appointment for 49.65% of a newspaper corporation's
stock, where three weeks earlier decedent made transfers of .88% of the
stock to each her two children because taxpayer briefly fragmented her
51.41% control block for tax avoidance purposes. Estate of Bright (5th Cir.
1981), distinguished, inter alia, on the ground that it preceded the
unification of estate and gift taxes.
B. Estate Tax Credits and Deductions
1. Estate of Clopton v. Commissioner, 93 T.C. 275 (8/29/89). Section 2055
estate tax charitable deduction denied for bequest to racially discriminatory
private school which had previously been exempt under §501(c)(3) but
which was not listed in the 10/31/77 Publication No. 78 (Cumulative List).
The revocation of exemption was not publicized, the executor knew nothing
of the revocation and the organization certified it was exempt (i.e., an
organization described in §170(c)).
2. Estate of Warren v. Commissioner, 93 T.C. No. 57 (12/14/89). Decedent's
will and applicable Texas law required that administrative expenses be
deducted from residuary corpus in determining the §2055 charitable estate
tax deduction. A settlement agreement adopted as an agreed final judgment
by the Texas Probate Court, allocating a portion of administrative expenses
to estate income, was not followed under the Commissioner v. Estate of
Bosch (U.S. 1967) doctrine because it incorrectly applied Texas law.
3. Estate of Hall v. Commissioner, 93 T.C. No. 60 (12/26/89). Charitable
deductions for a split-interest trust were disallowed under §2055(e)(2) and
there was no §2055(e)(3) qualified reformation because the Ohio judicial
proceeding to change the major defect in the trust was not timely
commenced.
4. Trent v. United States, 90-1 U.S.T.C. para. 60,009 (6th Cir. 1/11/90).
Section 2053 deduction disallowed for probate-court-ordered modified
(increased) alimony in excess of the actuarial value of the alimony payments
set forth in the original separation agreement, because the Ohio probate
court's order was void in that it had no jurisdiction to modify the original
alimony provision.
5. Estate of Carter v. United States, 90-1 U.S.T.C. para. 60,003 (E.D. La.
12/14/89). Simultaneous death of spouses, with presumption under
Louisiana law that the younger survived. Held, that where the younger
husband had a usufruct life estate in wife's estate, the value of that
usufruct should be determined under the valuation tables based upon his life
expectancy at the time of wife's death, resulting in a §2013 tax on prior
transfer credit to his estate of $292,000. Contra: Estate of Marks v.
Commissioner, 94 T.C. No. 44 (5/3/90) (reviewed, 15-1).
6. Rev. Rul. 90-8, 1990-5 I.R.B. Selling expenses and late payment interest on
additional taxes arising from the disposition of qualified real property
(under §2032A) to a nonqualified individual are not deductible as necessary
administrative expenses.
7. Rev. Rul. 90-3, 1990-3 I.R.B. 13. If a pecuniary bequest is required to be
paid with assets valued at the time of payment, the possibility that post-
death fluctuations (declines) in estate asset values may diminish the
residuary bequest to the surviving spouse does not cause the residuary
bequest to be a nondeductible terminable interest for purposes of §2056(b).
8. Estate of Higgins v. Commissioner, 90-1 U.S.T.C. para. 60,011 (6th Cir.
3/12/90). Marital deduction reduced because estate did not make a valid
QTIP election. The question concerning the election was answered "no" and
no property for the election was identified on Schedule M.
9. Estate of Chagra v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1990-352 (7/11/90).
Unenforceable (and unpaid) gambling debts were not deductible under
§2053; Texas probate court's approval of inventory that included these debts
filed one week before trial did not shift burden of proof to Commissioner.
Reasonable cause for failure to file timely estate tax return found in
executrix's reliance on specific legal advice given by the estate's attorney,
distinguishing United States v. Boyle, 469 U.S. 241 (1985).
10. Estate of Howard v. Commissioner, 90-2 U.S.T.C. para. 60,033 (9th Cir.
8/7/90), (2-1), reversing Tax Court. On challenge by estate of wife, QTIP
election made by husband's estate was held to valid even though "the stub"
(income accumulated between the last distribution date and spouse's death)
went to trust corpus and not to spouse's estate. Prop. Reg. §20.2056(b)-
7(c)(ii), while not having the force of law, was not a nullity and converged
with court's reading of the law.
C. Gift Tax
1. Estate of Dillingham v. Commissioner, 90-1 U.S.T.C. para. 60,021 (10th Cir.
5/14/90). Value of checks delivered to donors in December 1980 but not
cashed until late January 1981 were not 1980 gifts because donor-decedent
did not part with "dominion and control" over the property represented by
the checks under state (Oklahoma) law -- even though the checks were
cashed four months prior to decedent's death. The court refused to adopt
the "relation back" doctrine to make these checks gifts in 1980.
2. Rev. Rul. 90-45, 1990-21 I.R.B. 4. The surviving spouse's election of a
statutory share in decedent's estate is not an acceptance of "the [property]
interest or any of its benefits"; the subsequent timely disclaimer of a portion
of the property interest -- not later than 9 months after decedent's death
-- is a qualified disclaimer under §2518.
3. Estate of Smith v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. No. 55 (6/13/90) (reviewed, 10-
8). Section 2504(c) does not bar the Commissioner from revaluing prior
taxable gifts (made more than 3 years earlier) when calculating "adjusted
taxable gifts" under §2001(b)(l)(B) for estate tax purposes, but the taxpayer
should adjust the §2001(b)(2) subtraction for "gift taxes payable" in
conformity with any increase in value. The majority refuses to follow
Boatmen's First National Bank of Kansas City v. United States, 89-1
U.S.T.C. para. 13,795 (W.D. Mo. 1988).
4. Krabbenhoft v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. No. 56 (6/19/90) (reviewed, 14-
2). Section 483 does not apply to gift tax valuation, so the transfer of
$404,000 of farmland to taxpayers' sons under a $400,000 thirty-year
installment sale agreement, with 6% interest included in the annual
payments, resulted in a $151,000 taxable gift when the obligation was
revalued using 11% interest -- even though the §483 safe harbor interest
rate for purposes of the entire Internal Revenue Code was 6%. The court
refused to follow Ballard v. Commissioner (7th Cir. 1988) where this case
would be appealed to the Eighth Circuit.
5. Ordwav v. United States, 90-2 U.S.T.C. para. 60,035 (11th Cir. 8/10/90) (2-
1). Disclaimers constituted taxable gifts because they were held untimely
under Jewitt v. Commissioner, 455 U.S. 305 (1982), because they were not
filed within a reasonable time after obtaining knowledge of the transfer
creating taxpayer's interest; the disclaimers were not filed until 1979, 38
years after taxpayer learned of his contingent remainder interest in a 1917
trust.
D. Miscellaneous
1. Rocovich v. United States, 89-2 U.S.T.C. 13,819 (Cl. Ct. 10/16/89). Estate's
refund suit dismissed for lack of jurisdiction under the Flora (U.S. 1958)
full payment rule despite its contention that it was entitled to defer a
portion of estate taxes under §6166 because (1) the taxpayer must pay all
taxes the IRS has determined are due, and (2) §6166 is not an exception to
the full payment rule (despite the IRS concession to the contrary in GCM
35,696 (2/27/74)).
2. Estate of Hallas v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. No. 33 (4/11/90). There was no
conflict of interest in the Commissioner's calling as an expert witness an
appraiser who had previously valued the same property when employed by
taxpayer because no confidential information had been acquired in that
relationship. Further, held that there is no federal testimonial privilege for
appraisers of property; they have a public duty and are not advocates for
their clients.
3. Rev. Rul. 90-55, 1990-27 I.R.B. 7. A grantor trust is not required under
§645 to adopt the calendar year as its taxable year because its income is
reportable by the grantor as if the trust did not exist, so deferral cannot
occur.
4. Getty v. Commissioner, 90-2 U.S.T.C. para. xx,xxx (9th Cir. 9/14/90),
reversing 91 T.C. 160 (1988). Ten million dollars received from the
settlement of a suit brought by J. Paul Getty's son Ronald against the Getty
Museum is excludable from Ronald's income under §102(a) even though it
was in lieu of (as Ronald's lawsuit alleged) an equalizing income interest
(which would have been includable under §102(b)) promised to Ronald by
his father because his father would have "probably" remedied the claimed
inequality with a bequest of property.
XIV. Withholding and Excise Taxes
A. Rev. Proc. 89-47, 1989-33 I.R.B. 29. Alternative withholding (central withholding
agreements) for nonresident alien entertainers, athletes and similarly-situated
individuals, enabling them to qualify for reduced rates of withholding.
B. Hopper v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. No. 31 (3/27/90). Losses from real estate rentals
(self-storage facilities) were not available to offset attorney's law practice profit in
determining "net earnings from self-employment" for the §1402(a) self-employment
tax because services provided to tenants were not substantial.
XV. Legislation
A. P. L. 101-234, the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act of 1988, which enacted
§59B, was repealed retroactively.
B. P.L. 101-239, Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1989 (Title VII of OBRA), signed
by President Bush on 12/19/89.
C. Notice 90-6, 1990-3 I.R.B. 1. (1/16/90). Guidance provided on the interpretation
of "binding contract" for purposes of the RRA of 1989 transitional rules. A contract
is binding even if: (1) it is subject to a condition outside the parties' control; (2)
insubstantial terms remain to be negotiated; or (3) it is subject to formal board
approval.
